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Abstract 
Peter Kivy claims that expressivists in aesthetics cannot explain why we argue about art. The situation 
would be different in the case of morals. Moral attitudes lead to action, and since actions affect people, 
we have a strong incentive to change people's moral attitudes. This can explain why we argue about 
morals, even if moral language is expressive of our feelings. However, judgements about what is 
beautiful and elegant need not significantly affect our lives. So why be concerned with other people's 
feelings about art? Kivy thinks the best explanation of our tendency to argue about art is that we 
implicitly believe in objective facts about aesthetics. This would count against expressivism. I argue 
two things: (1) that there is no good reason to think that we don't care about preferences and emotions 
unless they have significant practical consequences and (2) that the truth of expressivism about 
aesthetic language is compatible with beliefs about objective aesthetic facts.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In a recent book, and an older article, Peter Kivy argues that emotivists lack a 
plausible explanation of the fact that we argue about art.1 According to Kivy, 
 
 '[t]his is not the kind of behavior consistent with the premise that all we are 
 doing when we call something beautiful, or a good work of art, is expressing 
 our preference.'2  																																																								
1 Peter Kivy, De Gustibus. Arguing about Taste and Why We Do It (Oxford: OUP, 2015) and Peter 
Kivy, 'A Failure of Aesthetic Emotivism', Philosophical Studies 38 (1980), 351-365.  
2 Kivy, 'A Failure of Aesthetic Emotivism', 351.  
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In his book, Kivy suggests that the best explanation of the phenomenon - barring 
certain exceptions - is that we implicitly believe in objective facts about beauty and 
artistic merit. My aim in this paper is to formulate an answer to Kivy's challenge on 
behalf of emotivism. I will proceed as follows: in section 1, I explain Kivy's 
challenge. In section 2, I explain why it also extends to more sophisticated forms of 
expressivism. In section 3, I suggest that we lack good reason to think that we are 
indifferent to other people's preferences. In section 4, I argue that the truth of 
expressivism is compatible with implicit beliefs in objective facts about aesthetics.  
 
1. Kivy's Case 
 
Kivy claims that an adequate account of aesthetic language should be able to explain 
why we argue about art:  
 
 'the emotive analysis of aesthetic discourse - or any analysis, for that matter - 
 must allow for a plausible account of aesthetic disagreement.'3  
 
Of course, disagreeing is one thing and arguing another, but Kivy is interested in the 
fact that diverging judgements about aesthetic or artistic features give rise to 
"disagreement behaviour": attempts to convince the other of one's viewpoint. It is the 
latter that requires explanation.  
 Kivy assumes that disagreement behaviour requires no special explanation if 
there are facts about the matter at hand. People clearly argue about facts, so whatever 
explains that can presumably be transferred to an arbitrary subject. What is less clear 																																																								
3 Ibid., 357.  
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is why we should argue about things that are a matter of preference or emotional 
response, which is what the emotivist believes about aesthetic judgements: they 
would be non-cognitive states (like preferences or emotions), as opposed to 
representations of a way the world is.  
 When Kivy says that we argue about art, he means that we argue about at least 
three things related to artworks: (1) their content- or meaning-properties, (2) their 
evaluative aesthetic features and (3) their overall artistic quality or goodness.  
 Content- or meaning-properties concern symbolic and representational 
properties of artworks. Examples are a dab of paint representing the Sun, a sculpture 
symbolizing desperation, and a protagonist being egocentric (or represented as such). 
Although people disagree about such features, content-properties present no special 
problem for emotivism. Emotivism is not a theory about (this kind of) representation. 
Either there are facts about what a work represents or means, or there are not. If there 
are, then emotivists can invoke whatever it is that explains our tendency to argue 
about facts quite generally. If there are not, then disagreement behaviour about 
content-properties is a problem for any account of aesthetic discourse.4  
 The interesting cases are evaluative aesthetic features, such as beauty,5 
elegance and garishness, and evaluative artistic properties, like how good or 
successful a work is on the whole.  
 Insofar as calling something beautiful or elegant is at least in part evaluating 
it, emotivists think the evaluation is a matter of emotional or attitudinal response.  																																																								
4 As Kivy notes, scepticism about content-properties is likely to trace back to scepticism about meaning 
or representation more generally.  
5 In the narrow sense, where it contrasts with sublimity or prettiness. 'Beauty' can also be used as a 
generic term for overal artistic quality, in which case it would fall under the third category of 
evaluative artistic properties.  
	 4	
Although we may speak about evaluative properties in a deflationary sense, there are 
no evaluative aspects of reality, and the function of evaluative language is to express 
(but not describe) our attitudes towards the world. Of course, terms like 'elegant' and 
'garish' may be thick evaluative terms, often thought to have both descriptive and 
evaluative content.6 If so, then their meaning is not entirely emotive. But the point 
remains that the evaluative aspect of their meaning is not a matter of property-
ascription.  
 Terms like 'artistically good' and 'artistic merit' can be compared to thin 
evaluative terms like 'right' or 'wrong' in ethics. Emotivists may think these terms 
carry no particular descriptive information as part of their linguistic meaning. If so, 
then they are "pure" expressions of emotion (preference, etc.). Alternatively, they may 
think that they have both descriptive and evaluative content distinct from that 
involved in thick evaluative terms.  
 Kivy wants to know how the emotivist could explain our tendency to argue 
about evaluative aesthetic and artistic features (henceforth I will simply use 'aesthetic 
features' to refer to both). This question presupposes that we do argue about them. 
Kivy realizes that not everyone argues about aesthetic judgements, but claims that this 
hardly distinguishes disagreement behaviour about art from disagreement behaviour 
about any other topic. After all, not everyone argues about the extinction of the 
dinosaurs either, or the way the pyramids were built. Some people simply lack the 
interest to engage. What requires explanation is the behaviour of a class of people 
Kivy calls the art-interested. These include laypeople and professionals sufficiently 
																																																								
6 Although there are dissenters, like Pekka Väyrynen, The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of 
Thick Concepts in Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 2013).  
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interested to argue about whether some art was great or unsuccessful, moving or 
insipid, well-balanced or uneven, etc.   
 Kivy is convinced that this behaviour exists:  
 
 'That the art-interested do dispute over the presence or absence of [aesthetic] 
 features seems itself indisputable. When the art-interested, either at the low 
 end of the expertise scale, or the high end, or in between, congregate after 
 seeing a movie or play, or after reading a novel in a book club, or standing 
 before a painting in a museum, they surely do converse about what they have 
 experienced. And they surely do not simply say “I liked it” or “I didn’t,” 
 “It’s good,” or “It isn’t.” They may indeed say all of these things. They will 
 not, however, leave it at that, usually, if they are the art-interested, and if they 
 do disagree. They will try to convince others of their judgments.'7  
 
 Kivy does not describe exactly how the art-interested try to convince others of 
their judgements, but art criticism is illuminating. Take the following fragment from a 
review of the film Boyhood by Bob Cesca:  
 
   '[...] the basic elements of storytelling need to exist in order to carry us 
 through. Showing various and random vignettes of a kid’s life is fine as long 
 as those vignettes inform the narrative rather than simply take up time. A 
 strong narrative thread is, for lack of a more academic word, entertaining. 
																																																								
7 Kivy, De Gustibus, 128-129. 
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 There’s a reason why movies are supposed to be a reflection of real life, and 
 not literally real life. Real life is often boring and anti-climactic.'8  
 
Cesca is trying to persuade us that the film is lacking in narrative interest, by drawing 
our attention to the fact that different episodes in the protagonist's life lack a function 
in a larger story. This suggests a general characterization of the method used to 
persuade others of one's aesthetic judgements: the art-interested proceed by pointing 
out evaluative and non-evaluative features that they assume will be recognized by the 
intended audience to indicate a lack of overall merit, or the presence of sentimentality, 
elegance, etc.9 Kivy thinks that the emotivist has no good explanation of most 
instances of this behaviour.  
 In the case of ethics, emotivists appeal to our interest in changing people's 
conduct: 
  
 'ethical judgments [...] are deeply involved with the incitement to and the 
 prohibition of actions, many of which I or those I care about may have a 
 personal stake in. And it is an obvious step in my getting someone to do what I 
 want him to do or not do is to get him to share my ethical emotion, my 
																																																								
8 Bob Cesca, 'It's Ok if You Didn't Like 'Boyhood', and Here are Many Reasons Why', (published 
online February 2015) <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/bob-cesca/its-okay-if-you-didnt-like-
boyhood_b_6694772.html>, accessed October 2017. 
9 A referee for this journal points out that people may not always do this, and that there are limits to the 
possibilities of persuading others. For example, if one's discontent with a work is due to preferences for 
certain colours, it may be hard to persuade another of one's judgement. However, the fact that there are 
limits to the practice does not show that it does not exist, or that there is nothing to be explained.  
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 attitude of approval of what I want him to do and to get him to share my 
 ethical emotion, my attitude of disapproval of what I want him not to do.'10  
 
But Kivy argues that even if this idea has merit in the case of ethics, it has none in the 
case of art. Attitudes towards art would not be connected to action in a way that could 
motivate us to try to change them. The idea is not that aesthetic attitudes are not 
connected to action at all, but rather that what they lead people to do is not something 
most of the art-interested could plausibly be motivated to change. Appreciating 
certain works primarily leads to (or consists in?) enjoying them, and secondarily to a 
disposition to choose to engage with them rather than others.11  
 The fact that enjoying certain works is connected to choice might suggest that 
we have an interest in influencing people's attitudes at least in certain circumstances 
(we may want to get the local curator to buy a certain work, or we may have to spend 
an evening together). However, most of the people we come across - and are prepared 
to argue with - cannot significantly affect our ability to see, read or hear the art that 
we prefer. So Kivy believes that this motive cannot explain most cases of arguing 
about aesthetic judgements.  
 An alternative is to appeal to a benevolent motive, since appreciating works is 
connected to enjoyment. However, this does not explain our tendency to dissuade 
others from their positive judgements.  
																																																								
10 Kivy, De Gustibus, 33.  
11 Kivy also discusses the possibility that people take there to be some relation between appreciating 
certain works and moral character, which would allow the emotivist to appeal to indirect connections to 
action after all. But this hypothesis strikes both me and Kivy as implausible. It is also unlikely that all 
discussion about the quality of art boils down to discussion of the moral significance of the work itself.  
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 Kivy also discusses the idea that 'we have [...] a deep-seated need to feel a 
sense of community [...] with others, and therefore a need for them to share our 
attitudes, our aesthetic and artistic attitudes included'.12 This need cannot be explained 
by the practical importance of sharing aesthetic attitudes (since they are not suitably 
connected to action), but we might have it nonetheless. However, Kivy claims that 
there is no evidence for this hypothesis, and some evidence against. The evidence 
against would consist of the fact that we also appreciate variety in taste. I will return 
to this in section 3. 
 Kivy's criticism of the need hypothesis is relevant to A.J. Ayer's ideas about 
aesthetic discussion.13 Ayer suggests that arguments about art concern factual (non-
evaluative) features of artworks, which might seem promising as there is no special 
problem accounting for arguing over facts. But he also suggests that our purpose in 
pointing out such features is to get others to share our emotional response. The latter 
brings us back to the question why we should be motivated to do that in the first 
place:  
 
 'After all, there is no such compulsion for me to get you to share my positive 
 emotion towards cheeseburgers or Golden Retrievers. It is all the same to me 
 whether you share them with me or not.'14  
 
 Since Kivy fails to see any alternatives to the options mentioned, he concludes 
that emotivism lacks a plausible explanation of aesthetic disagreement behaviour. His 
																																																								
12 Ibid., 43.  
13 Alfred Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1936).  
14 Kivy, De Gustibus, 32-33. 
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own suggestion is that we argue about aesthetic features because we are implicitly 
aesthetic realists: we believe that there are objective facts about beauty, elegance and 
the artistic quality of artworks. This allows us to refer the explanation of disagreement 
behaviour to whatever it is that explains our interest in getting the facts right.   
 Ayer's claim that aesthetic dispute always concerns non-evaluative features, or 
the idea that aesthetic language also has descriptive meaning, might seem to help in 
answering the challenge more than Kivy allows. For although Ayer suggests that our 
purpose in pointing out non-evaluative features is to get others to share our emotional 
response, he may not need the add-on. If differences in emotional response are 
explained by mistakes about the non-evaluative features of art, then perhaps we can 
explain disagreement behaviour with reference to our interest in the facts.  
 But things are not so simple. One problem is that some differences in 
emotional response are explained not by false beliefs about a work, but by ignorance 
of some of the work's non-evaluative properties (I may not have noticed references to 
X). It is not clear that we have the same interest in getting people to have more 
knowledge about things as we have in correcting false beliefs.  
 Perhaps the foregoing is not decisive. People who disagree about art might 
still believe that their disagreement is explained by false beliefs about non-evaluative 
features (beliefs that references to X are absent, say). But another, more serious 
problem is that we can imagine a scenario in which we agree on all the non-evaluative 
properties of a work, while still disagreeing about its beauty or artistic value. If our 
tendency to argue were explained by our interest in true beliefs about the non-
evaluative facts, then agreeing on those facts should leave us satisfied. That may not 
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be so.15 Another reason to doubt that all that we are interested in is getting the non-
evaluative facts straight, is that it frequently happens that someone points out in what 
respects a work should have been different.16 That cannot be explained by an interest 
in a work's actual descriptive features only.  
 As indicated, Kivy believes that the correct explanation of disagreement 
behaviour is that we implicitly believe in objective facts about aesthetics. It is not 
clear what Kivy means by 'objectivity'. The sketch of his own view about aesthetic 
features suggests a kind of Humean naturalism, according to which an artwork is 
good (elegant, etc.) in virtue of eliciting a certain response from all suitably qualified 
judges.17 If that is indeed his view, then Kivy may not think that people are committed 
to the existence of response-independent facts about aesthetic features (although that 
is also compatible with everything else asserted in the book). For the purposes of this 
paper, it does not matter very much exactly what is meant by an objective fact. I will 
argue that expressivism can explain the phenomena without postulating beliefs in 
aesthetic facts of any kind, and that expressivism is compatible with beliefs in 
objective facts on whatever understanding of the term.  
 
2. The General Nature of the Challenge 
 
Before suggesting an answer to Kivy's challenge on behalf of emotivism, let me 
briefly explain why it extends to more sophisticated forms of expressivism too.  
																																																								
15 A drawback of this argument is that we may be less certain whether disagreement behaviour would 
persist in the face of beliefs that others had all the right factual beliefs about a work. 
16 I owe this argument to Kritika Maheshwari.   
17 Ibid., 119-136.  
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 Emotivists about aesthetic language believe that evaluative claims about art 
express the speaker's non-cognitive attitudes towards the work in question. Such 
attitudes might be emotions, but can also be preferences or different kinds of state 
(Ayer says that critics express their 'feelings' towards artworks with the aim of getting 
others to share their 'attitudes'). One can either consider this idea as an account of the 
linguistic meaning of aesthetic terms or as an account of the use to which they are put 
(the latter would then allow that normative and evaluative language are strictly 
speaking meaningless, for instance). Kivy's challenge applies even if we interpret 
emotivism as a theory about the use (as opposed to linguistic meaning) of aesthetic 
terms, insofar as the purpose for which they are used precludes an explanation of 
disagreement behaviour in terms of an interest in getting the facts right. However, it is 
standard to interpret emotivism as a theory about the linguistic meaning of evaluative 
terms, so I will assume this in what follows.  
 The claim that evaluative terms must be understood as expressive of non-
cognitive states doesn't distinguish emotivism from more sophisticated forms of 
expressivism, such as Blackburn's18 or Gibbard's versions of the theory.19 Potential 
differences consist in the kind of attitude expressed by an evaluative sentence, and the 
lack of detail in the emotivist's treatment of evaluative discourse (Ayer and Stevenson 
say very little about embedding or logical validity). However, it is not clear whether 
Blackburn's view is distinct from emotivism with respect to the mental states 
expressed, as both he and emotivists are vague and liberal in their descriptions. 
																																																								
18 Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) and Simon Blackburn, 
Ruling Passions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).  
19 Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) and Allan Gibbard, 
Thinking How to Live (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2003).  
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Gibbard does distinguish himself by taking a specific view about the mental state 
expressed by evaluative language. In earlier work, he takes it to be a state of norm 
acceptance,20 whereas in later work, he thinks it is a state of planning.21 Kivy's 
challenge extends to Gibbard's views, since it is no more clear why we should want 
others to share our aesthetic norms or plans than that we should want them to share 
our emotional responses.  
 Some forms of expressivism claim that moral claims involve imperatives, such 
as Stevenson's analysis of 'X is good' as 'I approve of X, do so as well!',22 or Hare's 
prescriptivism.23 This marks a difference with both Ayer's emotivism and Blackburn's 
and Gibbard's theories. However, the move to imperatives does not help in answering 
Kivy's challenge. The aim of addressing imperatives to others is presumably to get 
people to change their attitudes, but the question is why we should be motivated to do 
so.  
 Some versions of expressivism involve the idea that evaluative claims are both 
expressive and descriptive, such as Stevenson's,24 Hare's25 and Michael Ridge's.26 The 
descriptive content would concern properties of the object of evaluation, including 																																																								
20 Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.  
21 Gibbard, Thinking How to Live.  
22 Charles Stevenson, 'The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms', Mind 46 (1937), 14-31.  
23 Richard Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959).  
24 Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms.  
25 Hare, The Language of Morals.  
26 Michael Ridge, Impassioned Belief (Oxford: OUP, 2014). Ridge is somewhat more difficult to place, 
as he currently takes expressivism to be a metasemantic theory about how moral words acquire their 
linguistic content. However, it seems unlikely that this content could be a matter of robust factual 
description, since that would expose expressivism to all the problems associated with descriptivist 
views in metaethics. 
	 13	
relational properties like its meeting certain standards, or being approved of by the 
speaker. Kivy would say that this does not help either so long as the primary reason 
for arguing about art is not to get those particular facts right, but to change each 
other's attitudes.  
 
3. Arguing about Cheeseburgers and Golden Retrievers 
 
Kivy rejects the idea that we have a need to share emotions and preferences quite 
generally. This is motivated by reference to cheeseburgers and Golden Retrievers. We 
are supposed to be indifferent whether others share our preferences (or "positive 
emotions") about those. This raises the question why we should be interested in 
changing people's preferences in the case of art.  
 It is not obvious that we are indifferent to people's preferences even when it 
comes to food and pets. Don't food critics engage in something that is in relevant 
respects indistinguishable from art criticism? Would it be surprising if someone 
argued that Golden Retrievers are inferior to Huskies? Even if there are differences in 
the extent to which we cultivate debate about such preferences, one might reasonably 
doubt whether there is a principled difference with art.   
 Of course, we also tolerate differences in taste in food and dogs, but this is no 
point of contrast either. Many people, including the art-interested, are happy to accept 
that others find a certain work beautiful or elegant, or that they prefer Monet to 
Mondriaan.   
 Perhaps fewer people are interested in arguing about food, or fewer people on 
fewer occasions. But this can be explained in ways that are nothing to do with the 
presence or absence of beliefs in objectivity. For instance, cheeseburgers do not stir 
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any significant emotions apart from gustatory delight in ordinary people, whereas art 
is more meaningful to us (or to those who care to argue).  
 Another reason why people might be more inclined to argue about art is that 
art has different status in (our) society. People may not want to seem unsophisticated 
in their taste in art, and to defend their judgements more than in the case of food. The 
fact that art has an elevated status might itself be explained by beliefs in objective 
facts about aesthetics, but that is not the only explanation (nor clearly the best). 
Appreciation of certain kinds of art might be associated with higher social classes, or 
have other contingent historical roots.  
 Perhaps debate about the quality of art tends to be more elaborate than debate 
about food or dogs. This can be explained by the nature of art and food, respectively. 
Ayer was right that aesthetic debate ordinarily focuses on non-evaluative features. 
This is to be expected, since aesthetic features are the ones under dispute, and the 
non-evaluative features (in part) explain our judgements about evaluative ones. In the 
case of art, there is (often) more to talk about. Many artworks involve storylines and 
symbolism. Art that lacks such features still exemplifies values or traditions. 
Although food can have interesting historical properties, it typically lacks 
representational and symbolic content. Most food does not try to make a point.  
 This leaves us with some doubt that we don't argue about matters of 
preference. We are often interested in the reasons why people like a certain thing, and 
are moved to express our disagreement. If so, then an important premise in Kivy's 
argument is undermined. Kivy relies on a contrast between debate about matters of 
fact and matters of preference or emotion. Since we wouldn't argue about preferences 
for dogs or cheeseburgers, debate about art would be hard to explain for the 
expressivist about aesthetic language. If there appears to be no significant difference 
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between our tendency to argue about preferences and facts in the first place, then his 
argument is not persuasive.  
 Of course, Kivy might say that whenever we do argue about dogs or 
cheeseburgers, we presuppose that there are facts to be discovered. The problem with 
that suggestion is that it was supposed to be motivated by the absence of disagreement 
behaviour about dogs and cheeseburgers. If we do argue about them, then this 
motivation disappears.   
 The foregoing leaves it open that the idea that we presuppose objective facts 
when arguing about food can be motivated in some other way. Perhaps the following 
is one: some people try to end debate by saying that the subject is a matter of taste. 
The reason this works might be that it draws attention to the fact that preferences are 
not answerable to objective facts about value.27 If so, then people find explicit beliefs 
about the arbitrariness of preferences an obstacle to reasonable argument. In that case, 
it is insufficient for a defence of expressivism to point out that we do argue about 
food and dogs. For such arguments may themselves presuppose beliefs in objective 
facts about value.  
 But again there is an alternative explanation of the phenomenon. Aesthetic 
debate may ordinarily proceed on the assumption that others share emotional 
dispositions (in fact, Kivy explicitly accepts this28). If so, then drawing attention to 
the fact that the topic is a matter of taste might block debate by negating that 
assumption, as opposed to a belief in objective facts about the subject.  																																																								
27 Of course, saying that a subject is a matter of taste carries the implicature that the speaker has had 
enough of the debate or that everyone is entitled to their own opinon, which may also explain why 
people then stop arguing. However, the question remains why saying that in particular should be 
effective, if topics that are explicitly considered as matters of taste are quite happily debated. 
28 Kivy, De Gustibus, 20.  
	 16	
  This leaves us with the conclusion that there is no strong evidence that we are 
indifferent to other people's preferences and emotions. Now, Kivy did say that there is 
no evidence for a need to share preferences or emotions. But this assertion is dubious 
if we do in fact argue about all kinds of preferences. He also said that there was 
evidence against it, consisting of the fact that we appreciate variety in taste. However, 
the fact that we appreciate variety in taste does not mean that we don't also appreciate 
communion. Various elements in our psychology can explain some of our behaviour 
some of the time.  
 None of the foregoing provides an explanation of our interest in comparisons 
of taste. I don't pretend to have one, although I suspect it is connected to our social 
nature. Clearly, awareness of shared preferences or emotions is often pleasant in 
itself,29 and dissent can be unpleasant. This might be enough to motivate us to argue 
about aesthetic judgements.  
 
4. Expressivism and Beliefs in Objective Facts 
  
There is another way to answer Kivy's challenge. The challenge is to explain why the 
art-interested might argue about art, if aesthetic statements express preferences or 
emotions. Since we would lack a need to share preferences and emotions, and since 
most debate involves nothing of practical importance, it would be hard to explain why 
the art-interested argue about aesthetic judgements. No such problem would arise if 
people believe in objective facts about aesthetics. If the latter is right, then another 
																																																								
29 Daan Evers & Natalja Deng, 'Acknowledgement and the Paradox of Tragedy', Philosophical Studies 
173 (2015), 337-350.  
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response on behalf of expressivism is to argue that its truth is compatible with the fact 
that people who argue about art believe in objective facts about aesthetic features.  
 It may seem unlikely that people believe in objective facts about aesthetics, as 
a popular proverb takes it to be fruitless to argue about taste.30 But Kivy would say 
that although people think they are subjectivists about aesthetic features, they 
subconsciously assume that there are objective facts about such features. The implicit 
belief would be revealed in their argumentative behaviour.  
 Although Kivy never says so explicitly, it is natural to interpret him as arguing 
against expressivism via its inability to explain why we argue about art. Kivy is 
looking for 'motives for arguing over matters of taste that [...] are compatible with the 
disputant's belief that our aesthetic judgments are expressions of positive or negative 
attitudes, not expressions of beliefs about the way the world is'.31 This seems to 
presuppose that if expressivism about aesthetic language were true, then ordinary 
people would know about it. An initial reason for doubting this is that even 
philosophers disagree about the correct semantics of aesthetic language. So why 
should ordinary people know that their aesthetic claims are expressions of their 
attitudes?  
 Some philosophers consciously believe that aesthetic claims describe 
(objective) facts, and there is no reason to doubt their competence with aesthetic 
terms.32 Others, whose competence is no more in doubt, consciously believe that 
																																																								
30 I owe this objection to an anonymous referee for this journal.  
31 Kivy, De Gustibus, 42.  
32 Eddy Zemach, Real Beauty (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1997), Thaddeus Metz, Meaning in Life (Oxford: OUP, 2013), Kivy, De Gustibus.  
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aesthetic language is expressive of our attitudes.33 This appears to show that the 
meaning of aesthetic terms is not apparent to most people competent with them (on 
the assumption that there is one uniquely correct semantics). If so, then it may both be 
true that expressivism is the correct account of aesthetic language, and that those 
willing to argue about aesthetic judgements believe in objective facts about aesthetics.  
 We might even provide an explanation of the compatibility. Michael Smith 
suggests that knowledge of meaning is a kind of know-how, as opposed to 
knowledge-that.34 Mastery of words does not consist in an ability to articulate 
definitions, or to explicate their meaning in theoretical terms.35 If this is right, then 
whatever it is that constitutes knowledge of the meaning of a word need not be fully 
consciously accessible.  
 Michael Ridge suggests something along similar lines:  
 
 '[...] understanding the meaning of a word is better explicated in terms of 
 knowing how to use the word properly rather than knowing that it means 
 such and such. Expressivism might be a good theory of the sort of know-how 
 associated with moral vocabulary even if ordinary speakers do not have 
 knowledge that it is.'36  
 																																																								
33 Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press), Blackburn, Ruling 
Passions.  
34 Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).  
35 Smith believes that this explains why conceptual analysis is hard, and that it provides a solution to 
the paradox of analysis.  
36 Michael Ridge, 'How Children Learn the Meanings of Moral Words: Expressivist Semantics for 
Children', Ethics 114 (2004), 301-317, at p. 303.  
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 However, it's not clear that a generic appeal to know-how as opposed to 
knowledge-that suffices to respond to Kivy. After all, no ordinary speaker believes 
that 'Hurray!' and 'Ow!' describe objective facts. That is very plausibly explained at 
least in part by people's linguistic mastery of the expressions. In fact, for any 
expression whose function is uncontroversially different from description, ordinary 
speakers' linguistic knowledge blocks the formation of beliefs about objective facts 
(think of imperatives or greetings). This counts against the idea that the truth of 
expressivism can easily lead to beliefs in objective facts about aesthetics, and suggests 
that the truth of an objectivist semantics may be more easily combined with diverse 
beliefs about the nature of aesthetic language.  
 So the expressivist needs to explain why people should form beliefs in 
objective aesthetic facts when they don't form beliefs in objective facts corresponding 
to imperatives or greetings. One obvious suggestion is that the grammar of evaluative 
language is the same as that of descriptive language. Grammar may blind people to 
the fact that it really serves a different purpose. However, it is not clear how plausible 
this is. Why should we believe that grammar as opposed to semantic content plays the 
dominant role in explaining people's beliefs about the purpose of the language?37 
Suppose there were a language which allows people to perform the speech act of 
accosting via a sentence with subject-predicate form, as in Dreier's Hiyo-example.38 
(Dreier stipulates that 'Bob is Hiyo' means the same as 'Hiyo, Bob', whose meaning is 
explicated in terms of the speech act of accosting Bob.) Would we expect speakers of 																																																								
37 Furthermore, even if speakers did believe that aesthetic language was descriptive, we need them to 
believe that it describes objective facts (as it equally hard to understand disagreement behaviour if 
aesthetic claims described facts about the speaker's psychology).  
38 James Dreier, 'Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth', Philosophical Studies 83 (1996), 29-
51.  
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this language to be unaware that 'Bob is Hiyo' could not describe a fact? Since that is 
very doubtful, a mere appeal to grammar is not entirely convincing.  
 In order to explain why the truth of expressivism about aesthetic language is 
compatible with beliefs about objective facts, the expressivist should probably appeal 
to the nature of aesthetic experience. The use of aesthetic terms is prompted by certain 
experiences. That does not by itself distinguish aesthetic terms from 'Hurray!' or 
'Ow!', but there are differences in the nature of the experiences with which their 
appropriate assertion is correlated. Many aestheticians believe that experiences of 
beauty are phenomenologically objective: beauty either appears to us as a mind-
independent feature (Hume39), or the responses that constitute the experience of 
beauty appear to us as merited by the object in question (Kant). Pain experiences lack 
such phenomenological qualities, as do the states expressed by greetings or 
imperatives. The expressivist could appeal to these differences in order to explain 
why people might develop beliefs in objective facts about aesthetics: the state 
expressed by aesthetic terms appears to us to represent an objective property, or as 
objectively merited by the object of response.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Peter Kivy argues that expressivists about aesthetic language cannot explain why we 
argue about art. Whereas expressivists about moral language can appeal to the 
practical importance of moral attitudes, this explanation would be unavailable in the 
case of aesthetics. There would also be evidence that we don't care whether others 
share our attitudes quite generally, making it hard to see how the expressivist could 																																																								
39 At least in Kivy's reading.  
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explain disagreement behaviour about aesthetic features. I have argued two things: 
first, that there is no strong evidence that we are indifferent to others people's 
attitudes, and second, that the truth of expressivism is compatible with beliefs in 
objective facts about aesthetics. This gives the expressivist two lines of response to 
Kivy's challenge.  
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